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I. INTRODUCTION
Exempt organizations have become players in election campaigns. The
activities in which they engage, the structures through which they pursue
these activities, and the sources of funding that support their campaign
activities create a broad range of experiences that cannot be crisply
summarized in either legal or operational terms.
Some politically active exempt entities are long-established
organizations with substantial programs of exempt activities, and these
entities that engage in campaign activities to promote their exempt
agendas. These entities speak, often quite loudly, in their own voices and
use their own funds to do so. In some cases, contributors are well aware of
the organization's intention to devote resources to campaign activities, but
in other cases, their intentions may be less clear. Some exempt entities may
be special-purpose entities devoted to electing a particular candidate. These
special-purpose entities are often created and operated by former staff
members from either prior campaigns or from a public official's staff.
Some special-purpose entities are alter egos of contributors seeking
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Harvard
University Department of Government. Professor Hill teaches courses in tax law, structural
constitutional law, and election law.
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vehicles through which they can direct more money than they could
otherwise give to electing their preferred candidates.
Even if it were possible to assign every politically active exempt entity
to one of these categories, this exercise would not permit observers to then
describe-on this basis alone-the activities in which any particular
exempt entity might engage. Some independent actors are willing to serve
as conduits for contributors or politicians by dealing in veiled transactions
that exchange money for later access and influence. Some special purpose
entities that are alter egos for a small number of contributors may raise
important issues of broad national interest. Some exempt entities, whether
independent organizations or special-purpose entities, are alter egos for one
or two contributors. Some exempt entities speak truth to power. Some
exempt entities are willing tools of the powerful. Some will present earnest
messages relating to their exempt purposes and these messages will be
based on a defensible factual predicate. Some will lie without scruple.
Some will engage in verbal drive-by shootings aimed at a particular
candidate.'
Neither the characteristics of the entity nor the activities in which it
engages can accurately predict or be predicted by the sources of funds.
Some organizations finance their activities, generally issue advocacy
activities that are consistent with their exempt status, from the general
treasury funds they raise from their usual contributor base. Some argue that
attack ads constitute issue advocacy, and they fund them quite openly with
their general treasury funds. Some otherwise independent organizations
will take money from political parties or from core supporters of a
particular candidate and run an ad or distribute a voter guide that serves the
interest of the campaign. Attack ads are commonly outsourced to exempt
entities to give candidates themselves deniability. Some powerful
incumbents fund exempt entities with public money through appropriations
over which they exercise disproportionate influence and then develop
innovative methods to move at least some of this money from the exempt
entity to their campaign coffers.
Based on past experience, this Article will make only one prediction:
several types of exempt organizations will play very active roles of all
types in the 2008 campaign, and this activity will be directed to supporting
the presidential candidates and congressional candidates of both major
1. The 2004 election produced a shorthand reference that has entered the standard political
lexicon-"to Swiftboat." "To Swiftboat" a candidate means to lie without restraint or scruple. The
reference is to the attack ad ran by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth that attacked the patriotism,
character, and veracity of the Democratic Party Presidential candidate, Senator John Kerry, a highly
decorated veteran of the Vietnam War who became a vocal critic of the war.
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parties. This is a prediction of continuity, not a prediction of change. This
has been the pattern since at least 1988, if not earlier.2
The most interesting factor in the 2008 campaign will be efforts to
understand the operational impact, if any, of the Supreme Court's decision
in Wisconsin Right To Life (WRTL). 3 Since the 2004 election, both the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Federal Election Commission
(FEC) have taken steps, albeit small ones, to clarify the law and impose
some reasonable operational limits on the campaign roles of exempt
entities. It is far from clear whether these efforts are consistent with the
Court's decision in WRTL. This Article focuses on two issues that are not
yet commonly discussed but which are likely to become increasingly
important.
The first issue is the potential impact of WRTL on the relation between
campaign activities and exempt status. This Article does not focus
primarily on the state of current law in this area.4 Rather, it considers
whether the decision in WRTL renders the limitations on campaign
involvement, imposed as a condition of exemption under tax law, an
impermissible burden on the organization's First Amendment right to
political speech. The second issue is whether the enhanced First
Amendment right of corporations to fund political speech, by using the
organization's general treasury funds, impermissibly burdens the rights of
members of the organization to exercise their First Amendment rights to
associate.
This Article begins with a discussion of the mutual attraction between
exempt entities and candidates for public office. Part III of this Article
discusses WRTL and the ways in which WRTL may make exempt entities
even more attractive to candidates by reducing the current risks to the
exempt entities for engaging in campaign activities. Part IV considers the
question of whether the limits imposed on the campaign activities of
exempt entities have become impermissible burdens on the First
Amendment political speech rights of exempt entities. If so, will section
501(c)(3) organizations be likely to play more direct roles in election
2. For a discussion of the use of exempt entities in the 1988 presidential primary season, see
Frances R. Hill, Charitable Contributions and Political Campaign Funding, J. TAX'N EXEMPT
ORGS. (Summer 1989).
3. FEC v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). In the spirit of disclosure, the
author discloses that she filed an amicus brief supporting the Federal Election Commission in the
prior case. Wis. Right To Life v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (as-applied challenges to the
electioneering communication provisions of federal election law are permissible).
4. For thorough technical discussions of the tax issues, see FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS
M. MANcrNo, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2002 & cumulative Supp. 2008).
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campaigns, and will this mean that a greater share of political money will
be deductible by political contributors as section 170 charitable
contributions? Part V of this Article considers the implications of WRTL
for the First Amendment associational rights of the members of and
contributors to politically active exempt entities. What alternatives are
available to members who become involved with an exempt entity to
support the entity's exempt activities but not its political activities as well?
What does the First Amendment right of association mean for those
members?
II. UNDERSTANDING THE MUTUAL ATTRACTION BETWEEN
POLITICAL CANDIDATES AND EXEMPT ENTITIES
Exempt entities and candidates for public office initially seem like odd
couples based more on the seductive quality of risk than on the prospect of
mutual reward. Viewed from the outside, these liaisons seem to present the
very real possibility of being more trouble than they are worth, particularly
from the perspective of the exempt entity. What accounts for the mutual
attraction? What does each party hope to achieve? What risks are each
willing to run? What are the anticipated rewards? Will WRTL make a
difference to the risk-reward calculus of either the candidates or the
politically active exempt entities?
Exempt entities offer political candidates an alternative to the campaign
finance regime established under the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA).5 The two most important sources of attraction for political
candidates are: (1) the absence of disclosure of either the sources or uses
of political money; and (2) the absence of any limitations on the sources or
amounts of political money. FECA requires candidates to report
contributions and expenditures to the FEC; the FEC makes all of this
information available to the public online in a searchable database.
In addition, FECA limits the amount that any one contributor may
contribute to any one candidate, to a political party, to a political
committee, and overall. While the individual limit may seem low, the
aggregate limitation is equivalent to the median income for a family of
four. Presidential candidates are now raising unprecedented amounts of
money, including substantial amounts on the Internet from relatively small
contributions. Is nondisclosure still considered desirable? The answer
appears to be that nondisclosure is still selectively valuable for particular
5. Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. 92-225,86 Stat. 3 (1972), as amended,
2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006).
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donors whose roles may seem controversial or which cannot contribute.
For example, federal election law provides that corporate entities cannot
use their corporate treasury funds for contributions to candidates and that
same limitation applies to the use of general treasury funds by unions.
While both corporate entities and unions may make contributions through
a controlled political action committee (PAC), FECA limits the fundraising
to persons with defined relationships to the controlling entity and limits the
number of times per year that such solicitations may be made.6 Corporation
or union general treasuries are not, of course, dependent on contributions
or subject to any such limitations. WRTL has made the use of corporate and
union general treasury funds a newly controversial issue.
Exempt entities, with some differences between section 501(c)
organizations and section 527 organizations, offer alternatives to each of
these requirements, limitations, or prohibitions in federal election law.
While this Article, like campaign finance planning, focuses on the
opportunities presented by the use of particular types of exempt entities as
components of a political fundraising enterprise, it is useful to begin with
a reminder that exempt entities are subject to an important limitation
applicable to all corporate contributors. For federal election purposes,
exempt entities organized in corporate form are subject to the same
limitation on contributions to candidates that apply to unions or to taxable
corporations.' The Supreme Court upheld this interpretation in Beaumont.8
Under its new test in WRTL, the Court took a different position with
respect to funding electioneering communications which could be
characterized as issue advocacy. This Article suggests that the reasoning
of WRTL signals broad and fundamental changes in the treatment of
corporations and unions as sources of political money and participants in
political campaigns.
A third source of attraction is the opportunity to offer the contributors
a charitable contribution deduction for their donations of political money.
This is the ultimate prize, the possibility of deductible political
contributions. Newt Gingrich explored this and the House of
Representatives levied a financial sanction for his actions.9 In the end, the
6. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4); 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.5(a) & (g).
7. 2 U.S.c. § 441b(a).
8. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2002) (section 501 (c)(4) organization may not use
its general treasury funds to make a contribution directly to a candidate).
9. Frances R. Hill, Newt Gingrich and Oliver Twist: Charitable Contributions and
Campaign Finance, 66 TAX NOTES 237 (Jan. 9, 1995) & 11 EXEMPT ORGS. TAX REV. 43 (1995).
See House Ethics Committee Report, Rep. 105-1, 105th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1997). See also technical
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IRS blinked. Why have relatively few political candidates taken this path?
Will WRTL cause candidates to reconsider their risk-reward calculus?
The attraction of exempt organizations to candidates and their
campaigns is less obvious and more troubling. Special purpose conduits
and alter egos established and funded for the purposes of enhancing the
electoral prospects of particular candidates or political parties offer no
mystery about the reasons for their actions. The issue here is why these
entities are treated as exempt and why they are not treated as political
committees for purposes of federal election law. Exempt organizations that
do have substantial exempt purposes and engage in exempt activities are
an entirely different matter. Their attraction to campaigns can be explained
largely by the preferences and ambitions of their managers and the failure
of boards of directors to hold them accountable. The problems posed by
unaccountable organization managers are discussed in Part V as part of the
larger discussion of association.
III. EXEMPT ENTITIES AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: WILL WISCONSIN
RIGHT To LIFE DEFINE A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PREDICATE?
The possible impact of WRTL on the role of exempt entities can be seen
most clearly if it is contrasted with the very different framework set forth
in McConnell. The McConnell1" framework was grounded not only on a
relationship between elections and the public policy process, but also on
a conviction that campaign finance was integral to the integrity of both.l
The goal of the law in this area was to ensure opportunities for
participation by ordinary individuals, including the right of individuals to
form organizations to amplify their voices in public policy debates and in
election campaigns. The majority opinion interpreted the history of
campaign finance law as a series of efforts to address innovative ways of
using financial power to gain favored access to and disproportionate
influence over public policy processes. 2 Within this framework, the
majority in McConnell took the position that the Court should defer to
reasoned congressional action, and found that Congress could take account
advise memorandum issued to the Progress and Freedom Foundation in February 1999 available
on Tax Notes Today at 1999 TNT 24-25.
10. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
11. Frances R. Hill, McConnell and the Code: Exempt Organizations and Campaign
Finance, 45 EXEMPT ORGS. TAX REv. 71 (2004) (McConnell as a case about representative
democracy).
12. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 95-97.
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of actual practices and abuses in campaign finance.' 3 This framework was
the foundation for the McConnell Court's identification and interpretation
of compelling state interests for upholding the major provisions of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).'
4
In WRTL, Chief Justice Roberts made it clear that he viewed the case
as implicating the speech fights of all corporations and that he had no
intention of considering distinctions among types of corporations. Chief
Justice Roberts observed that:
BCRA significantly cut back on corporations' ability to engage in
political speech. BCRA § 203, at issue in these cases, makes it a
crime for any labor union or incorporated entity-whether the United
Steelworkers, the American Civil Liberties Union, or General
Motors-to use its general treasury funds to pay for any
"electioneering communication . ".."15
Chief Justice Roberts would make no distinctions among the speech rights
of labor unions, advocacy organizations, and taxable business
organizations based on their organizational characteristics.
Chief Justice Roberts then stated that resolving WRTL's as-applied
challenge "requires us first to determine whether the speech at issue is the
'functional equivalent' of speech expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a candidate for federal office, or instead a 'genuine issue a[d].'16
He described this enterprise in the following terms:
We have long recognized that the distinction between campaign
advocacy and issue advocacy "may often dissolve in practical
application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied
to public issues involving legislative proposal and governmental
actions." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976) (per curiam). Our
development of the law in this area requires us, however, to draw
such a line, because we have recognized that the interests held to
justify the regulation of campaign speech and its "functional
13. See, e.g., id. at 96-98.
14. See id. at 133-34.
15. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2007). Chief Justice Roberts
emphasized the change represented by BCRA in this regard, observing that "[pirior to BCRA,
corporations were free under federal law to use independent expenditures to engage in political
speech so long as that speech did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of [a] clearly
identified federal candidate." Id. at 2659 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 2659 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 n.88).
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equivalent" "might not apply" to the regulation of issue advocacy.
McConnell, [540 U.S.] at 206 [&] n. 88."
As the opinion shows, it is far easier to devise a method of avoiding
characterization as the functional equivalent of express advocacy than to
craft a definition of grassroots lobbying that distinguishes it from an
electioneering communication.
This approach left the question: what constitutes express advocacy?
This question has produced two answers, one based on the magic word test
in Buckley which was rejected by McConnell, and one based on the facts
and circumstances of particular cases. These two approaches are in the
FEC regulations at 11 C.F.R. § 100.22. Chief Justice Roberts rejected the
first test and ignored the existence of the second test. This left him with no
test of express advocacy. This is scarcely an oversight. It is consistent with
the entire approach of treating speech as an undifferentiated concept
abstracted from its context.
Chief Justice Roberts focused not on a test for express advocacy, but on
devising a test for determining whether the ads in question were the
functional equivalent of express advocacy. The plurality opinion stated that
"a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express
advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate."18 The
question of what constitutes an "appeal" for this purpose was never
addressed. Similarly, the specificity of identification of a "specific
candidate" was never addressed. The indicia of a "reasonable
interpretation" are largely ignored, and difficult issues are dismissed with
observations about avoiding censorship.
In crafting this test, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the relevance of
context, including references to the intent or foreseeable consequences of
the ads. He reasoned:
[T]he proper standard for an as-applied challenge to BCRA § 203
must be objective, focusing on the substance of the communication
rather than amorphous considerations of intent and effect. See
Buckley, [424 U.S.] at 43-44. It must entail minimal if any discovery
to allow parties to resolve disputes quickly without chilling speech
through the threat of burdensome litigation. See Virginia v. Hicks,
539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003). And it must eschew "the open-ended
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2655, 2667.
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rough-and-tumble of factors," which "invit[es] complex argument
in a trial court and a virtually inevitable appeal." Jerome B.
Grubard, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredging & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527,
547 (1995). In short, it must give the benefit of any doubt to
protecting rather than stifling speech. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, [376 U.S.] at 269-70.'9
Chief Justice Roberts took issue with Justice Scalia's determination that
the test is impermissibly vague, reasoning that:
As should be evident, we agree with Justice Scalia on the
imperative for clarity in this area; that is why our test affords
protection unless an ad is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate. It is why we emphasize that (1) there can be no
free-ranging intent-and-effect test; (2) there generally should be no
discovery or inquiry into the sort of "contextual" factors highlighted
by the FEC and intervenors; (3) discussion of issues cannot be
banned merely because the issues might be relevant to an election;
and (4) in a debatable case, the tie is resolved in favor of protecting
speech. And keep in mind this test is only triggered if the speech
meets the brightline requirements of BCRA § 203 in the first
place.2°
Based on these principles and applying his test, Chief Justice Roberts
found that:
WRTL's three ads are plainly not the functional equivalent of
express advocacy. First, their content is consistent with that of a
genuine issue ad: The ads focus on a legislative issue, take a
position on the issue, exhort the public to adopt that position, and
urge the public to contact public officials with respect to the matter.
Second, their content lacks indicia of express advocacy: The ads do
not mention an election, candidacy, political party, or challenger;
and they do not take a position on a candidate's character,
qualifications, or fitness for office.2'
19. Id. at 2666-67.
20. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2669 n.7.
21. Id. at 2667.
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The references to legislation and a legislative nexus are not central
elements in the analysis. Chief Justice Roberts referred to a legislative
nexus as "basic background information" that "[c]ourts need not ignore."22
But, Chief Justice Roberts had previously indicated that his concept of a
legislative nexus would not be precise or controlling. This is consistent
with his treatment of the timing issue-the ads were run after the Senate
had resolved the filibuster issue which had threatened to gridlock the
Senate.23 Chief Justice Roberts observed that "a group can certainly choose
to run an issue ad to coincide with public interest rather than a floor
vote. '24 By labeling the ads issue ads rather than grassroots lobbying, Chief
Justice Roberts avoided the legislative nexus problem.
He also avoided indeterminacy of his concept of "issues [that] might be
relevant to an election."25 This statement allowed the Chief Justice to
address the election without addressing the impact on one or more
candidates. Such details as the timing of ads in relation to congressional
action are simply another contextual factor that should be given only
limited weight, if that.
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that "[g]iven the standard we have
adopted for determining whether an ad is the 'functional equivalent' of
express advocacy, contextual factors of the sort invoked by appellants
should seldom play a significant role in the inquiry., 26 At the same time,
"the need to consider such background factors should not become an
excuse for discovery or a broader inquiry of the sort we have just noted
raises First Amendment concerns. 27 Chief Justice Roberts then dismissed
the relevance of the contextual factors relating to the legislative nexus,
stating:
At best, appellants have shown what we have acknowledged at least
since Buckley: that "the distinction between discussion of issues and
candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may
often dissolve in practical application." 424 U.S., at 42. Under the
test set forth above, that is not enough to establish that the ads can
only reasonably be viewed as advocating or opposing a candidate in
a federal election .... Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed
simply because the issues may also be pertinent in an election.
22. Id. at 2669.
23. Id. at 2668.
24. Id.
25. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2669 n.7.
26. Id at 2669.
27. Id.
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Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the
speaker, not the censor."8
Using his test, Chief Justice Roberts concluded, "Because WRTL's ad
may reasonably be interpreted as something other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate, we hold they are not the functional
equivalent of express advocacy, and therefore fall outside the scope of
McConnell's holding."29 It was crucial to Chief Justice Roberts's purposes
that his holding not be confined to a particular type of speech or to speech
by a particular type of speaker. By describing the ads as "something other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate,"30 he defined
speech that could be regulated very narrowly.
Chief Justice Roberts rejected the argument that "an expansive
definition of 'functional equivalent' is needed to ensure that issue
advocacy does not circumvent the rule against express advocacy, which in
turn helps protect against circumvention of the rule against
contributions."'"
Noting that this reasoning had been established in "[rlecent cases,"3 2
Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that "such a prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis
approach to regulating expression is not consistent with strict scrutiny.""
He based this reasoning in part on the Buckley Court's refusal to sustain
expenditure limitations as a means of enforcing the contribution
limitations.34
Chief Justice Roberts eliminated any reference to either intent of the
speaker or the effects of the communications.35 He claimed that any such
test had been rejected in Bucklej 6 and that "McConnell did not purport to
overrule Buckley on this point-or even address what Buckley had to say on
the subject."37 Chief Justice Roberts found that reliance on an intent test
would "chill core political speech" because "[n]o reasonable speaker
would choose to run an ad covered by BCRA if its only defense to a
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2670.
30. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2670.
31. Id. at2672.
32. Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205). "Recent cases have recognized that certain
restrictions on corporate electoral involvement permissibly hedge against circumvention of [valid]
contribution limits (internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original)." Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2665.
36. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1976)).
37. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
criminal prosecution would be that its motives were pure."3" An effects test
would also chill political speech because it would put the speaker at the
mercy of the listeners.39
To these concerns, Chief Justice Roberts added a long discussion of the
burdens imposed by the kind of litigation that would arise in cases
involving an intent test, and in cases involving an effects test.
40
Chief Justice Roberts granted WRTL's as-applied challenge without
taking WRTL' s grassroots lobbying claim seriously. Indeed, he recast this
grassroots lobbying claim based on a framework derived from
Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL)41 and McConnell as a corporate
speech claim based on Bellotti.42 This enterprise was not merely a means
of resolving a case before the Court. It was a means of reinterpreting the
Court's precedents to devise a new framework for campaign finance
jurisprudence.
The new framework for campaign finance jurisprudence is based
centrally on Bellotti, not because it dealt with a referendum (a form of
lobbying), but because it dealt with corporations' rights to fund political
speech from their general treasuries.43 Chief Justice Roberts made Bellotti
central by ignoring distinctions between speech in the context of a
referendum and speech in the context of a candidate election, which was
at the core of the Court's holding in Bellotti.4 Recasting Bellotti as a
political speech case equally applicable to all types of political speech
would not have been possible if Chief Justice Roberts had taken WRTL's
grassroots lobbying claim seriously. WRTL's claim distinguished lobbying
from other forms of political speech, including, of course, electioneering
communications.45 Once he eliminated any reference to the distinctions
among types of speech, Chief Justice Roberts could extend Bellotti's
holding-a corporation may use its general treasury funds to finance
political speech in a state referendum-to a more general claim that a
corporation may use its general treasury funds to finance political speech
in a candidate election.46
38. Id. at 2665-66.
39. Id. at 2666 (Effects test "puts the speaker ... wholly at the mercy of the varied
understanding of his hearers." Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43)).
40. See Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2665-67.
41. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
42. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2652.
46. See id.
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The corporation is the speaker in this new framework. Distinctions
among types of corporate entities are irrelevant. WRTL was a useful case
for a statement of this new framework because it involved a corporate
entity. WRTL's corporate form was analytically central, its nonprofit status
provided helpful atmospherics, and its tax exempt status was ignored.
Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly referred to corporations without any
distinctions among types of corporate entities. In so doing, the new
framework is inconsistent with MCFL, which is based on the
organization's nonprofit status, its clear statement of a policy position, and
its policy against accepting corporate contributions.47 Under the new
framework, MCFL would have First Amendment rights because it is a
corporation, not because it is a particular type of corporation.4" Chief
Justice Roberts did not confront this conflict with MCFL directly. Instead,
he deftly cited MCFL as authority for the right of corporations to use
general treasury funds to finance independent expenditures that do not
involve express advocacy.49
The corporation as the speaker cannot be required to speak through
some other entity, even one that it controls, like a PAC. If the First
Amendment right to speak is a right of the corporation as a speaker, then
requiring that a corporate speaker use a PAC to engage in particular types
of speech represents a burden on the corporate speaker's First Amendment
rights.
Chief Justice Roberts found no compelling state interest for such
burdens.50 Indeed, he found few compelling state interests for any
limitation on political speech. He dismissed the relevance of preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption and the implications of
aggregated wealth.5'
Chief Justice Roberts did not create this framework from whole cloth.
This framework is found in the dissents and concurrences of McConnell
and its predecessors. Justice Kennedy's dissent in McConnell is a template
for the new framework set forth by Chief Justice Roberts in this case.52
Justice Kennedy relied centrally on Bellotti in claiming that Austin v.
47. See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 238.
48. Id.
49. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2692.
50. Id. at 2673.
51. Id. at 2672.
52. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 322-41 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also Justice Thomas's dissent in McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 at 264-86, which
bears an uncanny resemblance to the structure, language, and reasoning in Chief Justice Roberts's
subsequent opinion in WRTL.
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Michigan Chamber of Commerce should be overruled." He asserts that
"the majority's ready willingness to equate corruption with all
organizations adopting the corporate form is a grave insult to nonprofit and
for-profit corporations alike, entities that have long enriched our civic
dialogue."54 Justice Kennedy rejected reliance on aggregation of wealth or
concerns about the shareholders and members of corporations and unions
as adequate justifications for burdens on the First Amendment rights of
corporations and unions." Justice Kennedy adopted a framework based on
the speech rights of corporate speakers.56 The themes in Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion and the themes in the dissents by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas strongly suggest that there is a majority position on
the Court with respect to the political speech rights of corporate speakers,
which will be articulated in a variety of factual contexts going forward.
The 2008 campaign may well provide the factual predicates for future
claims.
IV. EXEMPTION AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY: STATUTORY
LIMITATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PREDICATES
WRTL creates a constitutional predicate for the First Amendment
political speech rights of corporate entities, including section 501(c)
organizations structured as corporations. It does not address the question
of whether exercising political speech rights will jeopardize the exempt
status of section 501(c) organizations.
Section 501 (c)(3) requires that organizations described in this section
not "participate . . . or intervene" in election campaigns." What is
prohibited and what test applies to making that determination remain a
topic of controversy. While section 501(c)(4) does not contain the same
prohibition,58 the IRS applies the same analysis to determining whether a
section 501 (c)(4) entity has engaged in campaign activity.
Tax law is based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
In the case of election activities by exempt entities, tax law looks to
evidence relating to the exempt entities' purposes and evidence relating to
the reasonably foreseeable consequences of particular activities. In sum,
53. Id. at 323-25. Justice Kennedy also dissented in Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
54. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 325-26.
55. Id. at 327.
56. Id. at 286-341.
57. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
58. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006).
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determinations of whether exempt entities have jeopardized their exempt
status turn on contextual analyses." The most recent guidance issued by
the IRS presents twenty-one examples rather than one test.6°
This kind of contextual analysis is precisely the kind of analysis that
Chief Justice Roberts decried throughout his WRTL opinion as an
impermissible burden on the First Amendment right of corporate entities
to engage in political speech.6' In determining whether the broadcast ads
at issue were properly characterized as express advocacy, which can be
regulated under FECA, or issue advocacy, which falls outside the reach of
FECA, Chief Justice Roberts took the position that "a court should find
that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad
is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to
vote for or against a specific candidate. 62 In applying this test, Chief
Justice Roberts categorically rejected tests based on either intent or
effects.63 Instead, he found that any test "must be objective, focusing on the
substance of the communication rather than amorphous considerations of
intent and effect." In addition, the test must not involve multiple factors
because that would lead to complex arguments and protracted appeals.65
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts took the position that the test "must entail
minimal if any discovery, to allow parties to resolve disputes quickly
without chilling speech through the threat of burdensome litigation., 66 It
is particularly noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberts found even the "threat
of burdensome litigation" an impermissible burden on the First
Amendment political speech rights of corporate entities.67
Consistent with this analysis, Chief Justice Roberts rejected arguments
that circumvention of federal election law by operating indirectly through
a tax-exempt organization constituted a compelling state interest that
would permit regulation of the broadcast ads in question. The Chief Justice
noted that "[a]ppellants argue that an expansive definition of 'functional
equivalent' is needed to ensure that issue advocacy does not circumvent the
rule against express advocacy, which in turn helps protect against
59. For a discussion and analysis of the applicable precedents, see HILL & MANCINO, supra
note 4.
60. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421 (2007).
61. See supra Part III.
62. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2007).
63. See id. at 2665.
64. Id. at 2666.
65. Id. at 2666-67.
66. Id. at 2666.
67. See Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2666.
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circumvention of the rule against contributions."6 He rejected this
argument, which he characterized as a "prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis
approach,"6 9 as "not consistent with strict scrutiny."7 °
Because WRTL is a constitutional opinion based on the First
Amendment and is not a statutory interpretation of FECA, Chief Justice
Roberts's reasoning seems to mean that the contextual facts and
circumstances analysis that pervades tax law should be rejected as an
impermissible burden on an entity's First Amendment political speech
rights. This would mean that the entire approach of tax law would have to
be reconceptualized in a manner consistent with Chief Justice Roberts's
analysis of the protection available under the First Amendment to
corporate speakers engaged in political speech. Because it is difficult to
imagine a communication short of an explicit endorsement of a candidate
for public office that would not qualify as issue advocacy under Chief
Justice Roberts's test and because interdicting circumvention of federal
election law is no longer a compelling state interest, all exempt
organizations would be free of any meaningful limitation on their
campaign activities.
Whether WRTL has this result will depend on whether the exemption
is treated as a subsidy permissibly subject to conditions71 or whether the
limitations on political speech are treated as an unconstitutional
condition. Subsidy theory analysis can be traced to Judge Learned Hand's
opinion in a case involving expenditures for lobbying and election
campaign activities by Margaret Sanger's American Birth Control
League.73 Judge Learned Hand wrote for a unanimous court,
"[c]ontroversies of that sort must be conducted without public subvention;
the Treasury stands aside from them. 74
The Supreme Court has never applied subsidy theory to an exempt
entity engaged in election campaign activities, but it has held that
limitations on legislative lobbying do not violate the First Amendment
68. Id. at 2672.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See generally Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (denying a taxable
corporation a deduction for expenses incurred in opposing a state ballot measure that would have
restricted sales of alcohol).
72. See generally Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (exemption from California
property tax could not be conditioned on taking an oath not to overthrow the government). For an
analysis of unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1421 (1989).
73. See Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
74. Id. at 185.
[Vol. 19
EXEMPT ORGAN!Z4 TIONS IN THE 2008 ELECTION
based on subsidy theory.75 The Court treated both entity-level exemption
and the charitable contribution deduction for contributions to section
501 (c)(3) organizations as subsidies based on the following reasoning:
Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that
is administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much
the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of
tax it would have to pay on its income. Deductible contributions are
similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual's
contributions. The system Congress has enacted provides this kind
of subsidy to nonprofit civic welfare organizations generally, and an
additional subsidy to those charitable organizations that do not
engage in substantial lobbying. In short, Congress chose not to
subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other
activities that nonprofit organizations undertake to promote the
public welfare.76
Using the same reasoning based on a subsidy analysis in a case involving
a taxable entity seeking to deduct expenditures for ads relating to a ballot
measure, in his concurring opinion in Cammarano v. United States, Justice
Douglas reasoned:
Deductions are a matter of grace, not of right.... To hold that this
item of expense must be allowed as a deduction would be to give
impetus to the view favored in some quarters that First Amendment
rights must be protected by tax exemptions. But that proposition
savors of the notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not
fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State. Such a notion
runs counter to our decisions... and may indeed conflict with the
underlying premise that a complete hands-off policy on the part of
government is at times the only course consistent with First
Amendment rights.77
Based on his demonstrated preference for indirection, Chief Justice
Roberts is unlikely to confront subsidy theory directly. Indeed, he may
have already made the case for indirection in WRTL. This would result in
applying the test for issue advocacy crafted in WRTL to tax law. Under this
75. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548-51 (1983).
76. Id. at 544.
77. Commarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
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test, virtually all of the campaign activities of exempt entities would be
treated as issue advocacy, which would make them exempt activities.
Applied most expansively to section 170 as well as to section 501(c)(3),
campaign contributions made to section 501 (c)(3) entities would be treated
as deductible charitable contributions. Public charities would be
particularly attractive as alter egos and conduits, and organization
managers who wish to use their positions to curry favor with particular
candidates would be unrestrained by concerns that they would jeopardize
the organization's exempt status. The only remaining issue would be what
this would mean for members who support another candidate or who want
the organization's general treasury funds to be used for purposes other than
enhancing the electoral prospects of a particular candidate.
V. ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS
The new campaign finance jurisprudence based on corporate speech
rights78 highlights a fundamental tension between the right of natural
persons to associate and the right of associations to be accorded the same
First Amendment rights as natural persons. How this tension is addressed
is important for giving the democratic values of participation and
representation operational meaning. The roles and rights of associations are
essential in permitting persons to join together to express their views and
press their claims in a large-scale society with a federal government, state
governments, and even local governments that are becoming ever-more
central to everyday life. Without effective organizations, individuals are
left to confront government authority alone as isolated and atomized
individuals. This kind of centralization of government power and
atomization of the population is the structure condemned by Alexis de
Tocqueville in his analysis of pre-revolutionary France.7 9 Individuals not
only have a right to associate, they also have a need to associate. In light
of his analysis of the nature of tyranny and oppression in his own country,
it is scarcely surprising that Tocqueville found the proliferation of interest
groups in the new United States an intriguing and hopeful indicium of the
strength of democracy in the new country.80 It should not be overlooked
that Tocqueville was writing about the propensity of Americans to form
78. See supra Part II.
79. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION (1856).
80. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1840). This analysis has come
to be something of a talisman for some in the exempt organization community. Too often it is
invoked to excuse lapses of organization managers. Only rarely is the central point-how citizen
organizations relate to democracy-considered thoughtfully.
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and join organizations, in short participatory organizations. He was not
writing about organizations controlled by unaccountable managers and
self-perpetuating boards." This more contemporary structure is both a sign
of growth and a challenge to a meaningful link between association and
empowerment.82 What does association mean today? A comprehensive
consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Any
comprehensive treatment will begin by directing attention to the issue in
the operational context of a national election. The 2008 general election
offers an excellent place to begin. The following discussion provides a
guide to observation and analysis.
The central issue is what the idea of membership means in exempt
entities and what membership means in terms of defining the use of an
organization's treasury funds for political activities.83 This question
immediately becomes enmeshed in paradoxes and complexities. Special-
purpose entities that serve as alter egos for contributors certainly mirror
their members' preferences." Their infirmity is not a matter of association,
but a matter of whether they should be regarded as a legal person separate
from their contributors and whether such an entity should be exempt.
Section 501(c) exempt entities can be divided into two groups
depending on whether they have members with rights to participate in
organization governance.85 Section 501 (c)(5)86 labor organizations have
members who elect their leaders. Section 501(c)(6)87 trade associations
often have complex membership structures that define various levels of
dues linked to various levels of membership rights. Most section
501(c)(3) 88 public charities and section 501(c)(4)89 social welfare
organizations have no members with rights to elect the board of directors
or to participate in organization governance in any other manner. Instead,
they are governed by self-perpetuating boards often composed of
inattentive members who leave the entire operation of the organization to
81. See id.
82. The role of managers in exempt entities has been addressed in tax law by multiple private
benefit doctrines. For a discussion of these doctrines, see HILL & MANCINO, supra note 4.
83. This is a core question with respect to all the activities of exempt entities. The new Form
990, the annual information return for exempt organizations includes questions about the
organization's governance, which should give the question of managerial unaccountability and
board members' failures to ensure accountability greater scruitiny.
84. See supra Part I.
85. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2006).
86. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(5) (2006).
87. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2006).
88. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
89. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006).
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professional managers.90 It should not surprise anyone that some of these
professional managers become impermissibly self-interested. 9' What has
been surprising has been the range of distinguished, indeed, venerable,
organizations that have suffered from an inattentive board enabling the
impermissible self-interest, sometimes linked with outright incompetence,
of managers.92 The kind of section 501 (c) exempt organizations that are at
the center of controversies over campaign participation are virtually all
section 501 (c)(4) or section 501 (c)(3) organizations without members. The
supports are generally referred to as members as a kind of honorific
shorthand for contributors, largely because it sounds more consistent with
the theme of civic engagement that politically active exempt entities strive
to claim.
If the organization managers decide to use the organization's general
treasury funds for campaign-related activities, the members have no
recourse. They have no role in governance. They have no legal right to
demand that their contributions be returned.93 The Supreme Court has held
that fundraising solicitations that are incomplete and even misleading are
protected by the First Amendment provided that the fundraising message
falls short of fraud under the state law applicable to determining fraud.94
The Supreme Court has rarely addressed the rights of members or
contributors to exempt entities, and the existing precedents can be
interpreted as contradictory. In Bellotti, the Court rejected arguments
related to the rights of shareholders, 95 and held that corporate shareholders
90. The reasons for this structure are the transaction costs of soliciting member votes on
corporate matters.
91. There are a panoply of private benefit doctrines designed to prevent such behavior. See
HILL & MANCINO, supra note 4.
92. During the past year, the Smithsonian serves as an example. The Smithsonian's board
consists of national leaders, including several senators and the Chief Justice of the United States.
93. Even contributors who make very large contributions encounter great difficulty when
seeking the return of their contributions. This is the case, even though large contributions are
generally made through agreements defining how the contribution will be used. The current
litigation involving Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Government is a case in
point. See generally Robertson v. Princeton Univ., No. C-99-02 (Nov. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., filed
July 17, 2002).
94. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 624 (2003). The
specific issue in this case was whether nondisclosure of the high percentage, in this case 85%, of
the money contributed that went to fundraising costs of professional fundraisers, provided evidence
of fraud. Id. at 605. The Court held that it did not. Id. at 624. Shortly before the Court issued its
opinion in this case, the Federal Trade Commission launched a law enforcement and public
education initiative relating to fundraising practices of exempt entities. See Federal Trade
Commission Web Site, http://www.ftc.gov.
95. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792-95 (1978).
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have remedies based on their rights to elect the board of directors or to file
derivative suits.96 Justice White dissented,97 arguing that shareholders
should not be "compelled to support and financially further beliefs with
which they disagree where, as is the case here, the issue involved does not
materially affect the business, property, or other affairs of the
corporation."" Justice White stated in a footnote that this analysis "would
not justify limitations upon the activities of associations, corporate or
otherwise, formed for the express purpose of advancing a political or social
cause."99 In support of his position, Justice White cited cases in which the
Court held that union members could not be compelled to contribute to the
union's political fund.'00
WRTL's new corporate political speech framework for campaign
finance jurisprudence undermines the First Amendment associational
claims of members, the treatment of these claims as implicating
compelling state interests, and the organizational structures through which
these claims are made operational under current law. One would never
know that organizations have members or that the First Amendment
protects the right of ordinary people to associate. This cannot be explained
as an oversight. Much of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in WRTL focuses
on whether the organization's constitutional rights as a political speaker are
protected by the right of a corporate entity to engage in political speech
through a controlled PAC. The concurrence takes contention with Chief
Justice Roberts for not overruling Austin.' °' The debate over Austin
encompassed a debate over the rights of members within their
organizations. 2 The PAC alternative was upheld, in part, because it
protected the members of the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce from
having their dues diverted from the core purpose of the organization to
support of a particular candidate for public office by using general treasury
funds for independent expenditures.l0 3 In rejecting the PAC alternative to
the use of general treasury funds in WRTL, neither Chief Justice Roberts
nor the concurring Justices considered this issue. They focused instead on
the concept that the PAC alternative impermissibly burdened the First
Amendment political speech rights of corporate speakers.
96. Id. at 795 ("shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own
interests").
97. Id. at 802-22 (White, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 812.
99. Id. at 812 n.12.
100. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 812.
101. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652,2678-79 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
102. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-55 (1990).
103. See id. at 660-61.
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Chief Justice Roberts's corporate speech framework rejects the idea
that different entities, including different types of corporate entities, can
have different rights and different roles in campaign finance. His
reinterpretation of Bellotti to avoid any reference to the distinction between
ads relating to a ballot measure issue and ads relating to a candidate
election, lays the groundwork for more expansive claims that corporate
general treasuries can be used at the discretion of corporate executives for
an unlimited range of speech. Under this framework, members can leave
organizations (the exit option) if that organization takes lobbying or
campaign positions that the member does not support."t 4 The price of the
exit option is that the members can no longer participate in the
organization's other activities. It does not give them the choice of
remaining in the organization without contributing to the PAC and without
funding political activities with which they disagree.
In some cases, the Court has recognized that the rights of members with
respect to their organizations is one element of the First Amendment right
of association. In National Right to Work Committee (NWRC),'0 5 the Court
upheld the limitation on PAC solicitation to "members" as an established
relationship with the organization that controls the PAC.10 6 In so holding,
the Court pointed to the interests of persons who want to participate in the
core activity of the organization, but do not share the organization
managers' electoral or legislative choices."0 7
The most recent of these cases is FEC v. Beaumont.0 8 Beaumont
involved a claim by a section 501(c)(4) organization that it had a First
Amendment right to make direct contributions to political candidates even
though it accepted contributions from corporations as well as
individuals."19 In rejecting this claim, the Court considered the burden on
the associational rights of members, observing that "corporations' First
Amendment speech and association interests are derived largely from those
of their members."" 0 The Court held that concern for the association rights
of members did not impermissibly burden the speech rights of the
organization because the organization could make contributions through
104. ALBERT O. HlRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMs,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
105. FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
106. Id. at 206.
107. See id. at 207-08.
108. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
109. Id. at 149-50.
110. Id. at 161 n.8.
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its controlled PAC."' The Court observed that "[t]he PAC option allows
corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate
funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of
some shareholders or members.""'
The Court took the same position with respect to the PAC option for
funding independent expenditures in Austin, reasoning that "[b]ecause
persons contributing to such funds understand that their money will be
used solely for political purposes, the speech generated accurately reflects
contributors' support for the corporation's political views.""' 3 The Court
in McConnell cited these concerns in holding that the electioneering
communication provision did not burden the First Amendment rights of
corporations and unions.114 In addition, the Court in McConnell held that
MCFL-type organizations were not subject to the financing limitations
applicable to other corporations, in part, because members and prospective
members joined such organizations voluntarily with full knowledge of the
positions such advocacy organizations would take in political debates. 5
In WRTL, Chief Justice Roberts simply ignored this issue. Despite the
efforts he made to reject the other claims relating to compelling state
interests, he did not address the question of the associational rights of
members. This approach is consistent with his reliance on Bellotti as the
centerpiece of his new framework for campaign finance jurisprudence. In
Bellotti, the Court rejected claims that permitting corporate entities to use
its general treasury funds to finance communications with respect to a
referendum issue infringed on the rights of shareholders who took a
different position on the issue." 6 The Court found that shareholders had
ample remedies through election of the board of directors, through
amendment of the corporate charter, or through a derivative suit." 7
WRTL protected corporate speakers from having to choose between not
funding certain speech that would otherwise fall within the definition of an
electioneering communication or financing such speech by using funds in
their controlled PACs. In the case of section 501(c)(4) organizations,
WRTL protected such organizations from the choice between not speaking
or choosing to forego contributions for corporate or union contributors. In
sum, WRTL rejected the constitutional sufficiency of using alternative
111. Seeid. at 162-63.
112. Id. at 163.
113. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660-61 (1990).
114. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204-05 (2003).
115. Id. at209-11.
116. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792-95 (1978).
117. See id. at 794-95.
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entities to pursue various types of speech. The framework set forth in Chief
Justice Roberts's opinion would generalize this rejection of choice of entity
planning.
The dilemma going forward is that absolutist protection for corporate
speakers leaves little, if any, protection for the associational rights of
members. Dissidents can, under this framework, form their own
organizations, but that would also be a choice forced by a legal regime.
Why should individuals who want to support WRTL's core mission, be
forced to allow their contributions be used to support or oppose the
candidate designated by the organization's executives? These questions
become particularly compelling as the candidate choices or the lobbying
positions are less directly related to the organization's core mission.
These are difficult questions under the First Amendment rights of
association and petition, "the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." ''H To
paraphrase Justice Scalia, it is a "sad day""' 9 for the First Amendment
when the Court shifts the framework for campaign finance jurisprudence
away from even the possibility that the right of association will encompass
the rights of members in their organizations.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
119. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 ("This is a sad day for the freedom of speech.").
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